When do referees shirk in a peer review process?

Sahana Roy Chowdhury


This note obtains conditions for existence of shirking referees in peer review process. When referees are heterogeneous say, bad ($b$) and good ($g$), only for a medium range of probability of getting a good paper $p$, both referees prefer reading over shirking. It never happens that $b$ reads while $g$ shirks. Both prefer `shirking and rejecting (accepting)' if $p$ is low (high) enough. The paper shows that a two-referee cross-examination review reduces the error of accepting a bad paper only for a small range of probability.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.5.2.2016.45-49


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